| Abstract | [Introduction]
It seems that the theory of action deserves more attention than it has received and that the interlacing of the processes of perceiving and acting is a problem and we can perhaps no longer afford to ignore. This chapter is a preliminary and speculative response to these reproofs. Its purpose is twofold: first, to identify a set of basic principles to characterize the style of the action system in the production of coordinated activity; second, to describe, in a rough and approximate way, how the contents of vision may relate to processes of action. To a significant degree, the ideas expressed in this chapter derive, on the one hand, from the work of Nicolai Bernstein (1967) and Russian investigators who have followed his intuitions, and on the other hand, from the analysis and amplification of the Russian views by Peter Greene (1971a,b). We begin our inquiry by illustrating and equivalence between problems of action and problems of perception and cognition (cf. Turvey, 1974). |